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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge. 
 
Once again, we review Renee M. Smith's appeal from the 
District Court's dismissal for failure to state a claim and its 
denial of her motion to amend her complaint. Smith alleges 
that the National College Athletic Association's bylaw, 
which prohibited her from participating in athletics while 
enrolled in a graduate program outside her undergraduate 
institution, violated Title IX of the Education Amendments 
of 1972. The primary issue we must decide is whether the 
NCAA can be considered a recipient of federal funds, 
thereby subjecting it to Title IX. Smith initially attempted to 
amend her complaint to argue that the NCAA is subject to 
Title IX because it receives dues from its members 
universities, which are recipients of federal funds. We 
accepted this theory in Smith v. NCAA, 139 F.3d 180, 189 
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(3d Cir. 1998). The United States Supreme Court, however, 
reversed, but left Smith's two alternative theories for 
bringing the NCAA under the prescriptions of Title IX 
unresolved. See NCAA v. Smith, 525 U.S. 459, 468-470, 
119 S.Ct. 924, 929-30 (1999). Those two theories are now 
before us in this appeal. 
 
I. BACKGROUND 
 
The NCAA is an unincorporated association comprised of 
public and private colleges and universities. It is 
responsible for promulgating rules governing all aspects of 
intercollegiate athletics, including recruiting, eligibility of 
student-athletes, and academic standards. By joining the 
NCAA, members agree to abide by and enforce these rules. 
Among them is the Postbaccalaureate Bylaw, which allows 
a postgraduate student-athlete to participate in 
intercollegiate athletics only at the institution that awarded 
her an undergraduate degree. 
 
Smith was an undergraduate at St. Bonaventure 
University, an NCAA member, where she played 
intercollegiate volleyball in 1991-92 and 1992-93. She 
chose not to play volleyball during the 1993-94 season. 
Smith graduated from St. Bonaventure in two and one half 
years. Thereafter, she enrolled in a post-graduate program 
at Hofstra University that was not offered at St. 
Bonaventure. During the 1995-96 academic year, she 
enrolled in a different post-graduate program at the 
University of Pittsburgh. Like Hofstra, St. Bonaventure did 
not offer this program. In both years, Smith sought to play 
intercollegiate volleyball, but the NCAA denied her eligibility 
under its Postbaccalaureate Bylaw. The NCAA also declined 
Hofstra's and the University of Pittsburgh's requests for a 
waiver of the Bylaw. 
 
In August 1996, Smith filed her initial complaint in this 
case. She alleged, inter alia, that the NCAA's refusal to 
grant a waiver excluded her from participation in 
intercollegiate athletics on the basis of her sex in violation 
of Title IX.1 The NCAA moved to dismiss the complaint on 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Smith also alleged violations of the Sherman Act and state contract 
law. The District Court dismissed the Sherman Act claim and declined 
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the ground that it failed to allege that the NCAA is a 
recipient of federal financial assistance, and the District 
Court agreed. See Smith v. NCAA, 978 F. Supp. 213, 219- 
20 (W.D. Pa. 1997). Smith then filed a motion for leave to 
amend her complaint to allege that the NCAA "receives 
federal financial assistance through another recipient and 
operates an educational program, or activity which receives 
or benefits from such assistance." The District Court denied 
the motion, holding that it was moot. 
 
We reversed. Although Smith's original complaint failed 
to state a Title IX claim, we held that her allegation that the 
NCAA receives dues from federally-funded member 
institutions was sufficient to bring the NCAA "within the 
scope of Title IX as a recipient of federal funds and would 
survive a motion to dismiss." Smith, 139 F.3d at 190. The 
Supreme Court disagreed. It held that the mere fact that an 
entity receives dues from a federally-funded program is not, 
by itself, sufficient to render it a recipient of federal funds. 
See Smith, 525 U.S. at 468, 119 S.Ct. at 929. The Court 
explained that "[a]t most, the Association's receipt of dues 
demonstrates that it indirectly benefits from federal 
assistance afforded its members." Id. Thus, the Supreme 
Court vacated our decision. It noted, however, that Smith 
pressed two alternative theories for bringing the NCAA 
under the purview of Title IX. Specifically, she argued that 
when a recipient cedes "controlling authority" over a 
federally funded program, the controlling entity is covered 
by Title IX. See id. at 469-70, 119 S.Ct. at 930. She also 
argued that the NCAA directly and indirectly receives 
federal financial assistance through the National Youth 
Sports Program ("NYSP")2 and the National Youth Sports 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
to retain supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims. See Smith v. 
NCAA, 978 F. Supp. 213, 218, 220 (W.D. Pa. 1997). We affirmed the 
dismissal of the Sherman Act claim, Smith, 139 F.3d at 187, and the 
Supreme Court denied certiorari. See Smith, 525 U.S. at 464 n.2, 119 
S.Ct. at 927 n.2. 
 
2. The NYSP is a youth enrichment program that provides summer 
education and sports instruction on NCAA member and non-member 
institution campuses. The NYSP receives federal financial assistance 
from the Department of Health and Human Services. See Cureton v. 
NCAA, 198 F.3d 107, 110 (3d Cir. 1999). 
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Program Fund ("Fund"), which are administered by the 
NCAA. See id. The Court did not address these theories but 
instead left them "to the courts below on remand." Id. 
Accordingly, they are now before us for consideration. 
 
II. DISCUSSION 
 
A. Controlling Authority Theory 
 
Smith first argues that the NCAA is subject to Title IX 
because it has "controlling authority" over the 
intercollegiate athletic programs of its member institutions 
that receive federal financial assistance.3 She seeks to 
amend her complaint to include this theory. 
 
We have previously addressed whether the NCAA has 
"controlling authority" over its federally-funded members in 
the context of Title VI. In Cureton v. NCAA, 198 F.3d 107 
(3d Cir. 1999), African-American student athletes alleged 
that the NCAA's scholastic aptitude test requirements 
concerning freshman year intercollegiate competition 
disparately impacted them and thus violated Title VI.4 The 
NCAA moved to dismiss the complaint arguing, inter alia, 
that the NCAA does not receive federal funds. See id. at 
111. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Section 901(a) of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 
U.S.C. S 1681(a), provides that "[n]o person in the United States shall, 
on 
the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the 
benefits 
of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or 
activity receiving Federal financial assistance." Under the Civil Rights 
Restoration Act of 1987, 102 Stat. 28, 20 U.S.C.S 1687(2)(A), a "program 
or activity" includes "all of the operations of . . . a college, 
university, or 
other postsecondary institution, or a public system of higher education 
. . . any part of which is extended Federal financial assistance." 
Intercollegiate athletics is an educational program or activity within the 
statute. See 20 U.S.C. S 1687; 34 C.F.R. S 106.41. Thus, the NCAA is 
subject to Title IX provided that it receives federal financial assistance 
within the meaning of 1681(a). 
 
4. Title VI precludes exclusion from participation in, denial of the 
benefits of, and discrimination under any program or activity receiving 
federal financial assistance on account of race, color, or national 
origin. 
See 42 U.S.C. S 2000d et seq. 
 
                                5 
  
The District Court held that the prohibition's disparate 
impact on African-Americans violated Title VI and its 
corresponding regulations. The court adopted two distinct 
theories to support its finding. First, the court determined 
that the NCAA was an "indirect recipient of federal financial 
assistance" because it exercised effective control over a 
block grant given by the United States Department of 
Health and Human Services to the NYSP. Second, the court 
held that Title VI covered the NCAA because member 
schools had vested the NCAA with controlling authority 
over their federally-funded athletic programs. See id. at 
111-12 (citing Cureton v. NCAA, 37 F. Supp.2d 687, 694 
(E.D. Pa. 1999)). 
 
We reversed the District Court with respect to both 
theories. First, we assumed without deciding that the 
NCAA's relationship with the NYSP and the Fund rendered 
it an indirect recipient of federal financial assistance. 
However, we concluded that the regulations implementing 
Title VI are program specific--that is, they only forbid 
disparate impact discrimination in programs that actually 
receive federal financial assistance. Therefore, we held that, 
to the extent the plaintiffs' claims were predicated upon the 
NCAA's receipt of federal financial assistance through the 
Fund, they were insufficient, because the Postbaccalaureate 
Bylaw was unrelated to the Fund's programs. See id. at 
115-16. 
 
Next, we rejected the plaintiffs' "controlling authority" 
theory. In so doing, we relied upon the Supreme Court's 
decision in NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 109 S.Ct. 
454 (1988). In Tarkanian, the NCAA recommended that the 
University of Nevada at Las Vegas ("UNLV") suspend its 
men's basketball coach following the NCAA's investigation 
into numerous allegations of rules violations. UNLV 
disagreed with the NCAA's recommendation, but ultimately 
adopted it. The coach then brought an action under 42 
U.S.C. S 1983, claiming that the NCAA was a state actor, 
because UNLV delegated its functions to the NCAA and 
ceded its authority both to adopt and enforce rules 
governing UNLV's athletic programs. The Court held that 
the NCAA was not a state actor. Although it recognized that 
the NCAA's rules and recommendations clearly influenced 
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UNLV, it concluded that the University, not the NCAA, 
made disciplinary decisions concerning its employees. The 
Court explained that UNLV had choices. It could have 
retained Coach Tarkanian in spite of NCAA 
recommendations and risked sanctions, or it could have 
voluntarily withdrawn from the NCAA. The Court stated 
that although "UNLV's options were unpalatable does not 
mean that they were nonexistent." Id. at 198 n.19, 109 
S.Ct. at 465 n.19. 
 
Based on the above, we concluded that Tarkanian  "makes 
clear that the NCAA does not `control' its members." 
Cureton, 198 F.3d at 116. We reasoned that, similar to the 
personnel and employee decisions at issue in Tarkanian, 
the ultimate decision as to which freshman will participate 
in varsity intercollegiate athletics belongs to the member 
schools. We stated: "The fact that the institutions make 
these decisions cognizant of NCAA sanctions does not mean 
the NCAA controls them, because they have the option, 
albeit unpalatable, of risking sanctions or voluntarily 
withdrawing from the NCAA." Id. at 116. We also noted that 
the NCAA's constitution expressly provides for the retention 
of institutional control over individual athletic programs. 
See id. at 118. As such, we concluded that: 
 
       [W]e cannot understand how the fact that the NCAA 
       promulgates rules and regulations with respect to 
       intercollegiate athletics somehow means that the NCAA 
       has controlling authority over its members' programs 
       or activities receiving Federal financial assistance. After 
       all, the institutions decide what applicants to admit, 
       what employees to hire, and what facilities to acquire. 
 
Id. at 117-18. Accordingly, we held that the NCAA is not 
subject to the prohibitions of Title VI because its member 
institutions do not cede control of their athletic programs to 
the NCAA. 
 
Finally, we recognized that applying disparate impact 
regulations to the NCAA would be inconsistent with the 
contractual character of Title VI. See id. at 118. Specifically, 
we noted that there is no contractual privity between the 
Department of Health and Human Services, the Department 
of Education, and the NCAA with respect to the federal 
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financial assistance to colleges and universities. The NCAA 
is not in a position to accept or reject the federal funds paid 
to these institutions. We acknowledged, however, that the 
absence of contractual privity is not an absolute bar to 
possessing controlling authority. If an entity truly assumes 
control of a federally-funded program, then it is in a 
position to accept or reject that control as part of its 
decision whether or not to receive funds indirectly. 
Nonetheless, we noted that, where there is an absence of 
privity, courts should be cautious in imposing Title VI. See 
id. at 118. 
 
Our decision in Cureton precludes Smith's"controlling 
authority" argument in the context of Title IX. Smith's 
theory is identical to the one alleged and rejected in 
Cureton. Like the Cureton plaintiffs, Smith alleges that the 
NCAA exercised controlling authority over its federally- 
funded member institutions because it had the power to 
establish rules governing intercollegiate athletics at member 
schools and made individual eligibility and waiver 
decisions. Smith alleges nothing new with respect to the 
NCAA's purported control over its members. Compare 
Appellant's Br. at 19 ("[T]he NCAA has the power to 
establish rules governing intercollegiate athletics at member 
schools, including rules concerning eligibility . . . thus has 
effective control over eligibility determination and is the 
entity most responsible for discrimination that might enter 
into such determinations."), with Cureton, 198 F.3d at 117- 
18 ("We emphasize that the NCAA members have not ceded 
controlling authority to the NCAA by giving it the power to 
enforce its eligibility rules directly against the students."). 
Similar to the plaintiffs in Cureton, Smith is attacking an 
eligibility rule that NCAA members may choose to enforce 
or ignore. As such, Cureton directly controls.5 Accordingly, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. We note that the United States District Court for the District Court of 
New Jersey has interpreted Cureton in this manner. Specifically, in 
Bowers v. NCAA, 118 F. Supp. 2d 494 (D.N.J. 2000), the District Court 
examined whether the NCAA is a recipient of federal funds, thereby 
subjecting it to the restrictions of S 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. In 
addition to several other theories, the plaintiff contended that the NCAA 
is a recipient of federal funds because the NCAA's member institutions, 
which receive federal funding, have ceded "controlling authority" over 
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Smith is precluded from amending her complaint to include 
her "controlling authority" theory, as it is futile. See In re 
Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1434 (3d 
Cir. 1997) ("An amendment is futile if the complaint, as 
amended, would not survive a motion to dismiss for failure 
to state a claim upon which relief could be granted."). 
 
The fact that Cureton concerned Title VI rather than Title 
IX does nothing to alter its impact on the present case. As 
the Supreme Court noted in Smith, the scope of Title VI is 
defined in terms nearly identical to Title IX. Smith, 525 U.S. 
at 466 n.3, 119 S.Ct. at 928 n.3. Courts have consistently 
applied the same legal analysis to construe Title VI and 
Title IX. Therefore, our discussion of the controlling 
authority theory in the context of Title VI is applicable to 
Title IX claims. 
 
Smith alleges that the Supreme Court's decision in 
Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic 
Ass'n, 121 S.Ct. 924 (2001), demonstrates that our 
rejection of the "controlling authority" theory in Cureton 
was incorrect. In Brentwood, a private high school sued a 
state interscholastic athletic association under 42 U.S.C. 
S 1983, seeking to prevent the enforcement of a rule that 
prohibited the use of undue influence in the recruitment of 
student athletes. The association regulated interscholastic 
athletic competition among public and private secondary 
schools. The issue before the Court was whether the 
enforcement of the association's rules constituted state 
action. The Court answered in the affirmative based upon 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
intercollegiate athletics to the NCAA. Following our holding in Cureton, 
the court rejected the plaintiff 's argument. The court stated: 
 
       Bowers also argues that the NCAA is a recipient of federal funds 
       because the NCAA's member institutions have "ceded controlling 
       authority" over intercollegiate athletics to the NCAA and because 
the 
       NCAA's member institutions receive federal funds. The Third Circuit 
       has explicitly rejected this argument as a basis for finding that 
the 
       NCAA is a recipient of federal financial assistance.  
 
Id. at 527 n.25 (emphasis added). We agree with the District Court of 
New Jersey's interpretation of Cureton. 
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the "pervasive entwinement" of state school officials in the 
association's structure. See id. at 927-29. 
 
The Court reasoned that "the nominally private character 
of the association is overborne by the pervasive 
entwinement of public institutions and public officials in its 
composition and workings, and there is no substantial 
reason to claim unfairness in applying constitutional 
standards to it." Id. at 932. In particular, the Court noted 
that the association was largely an organization of schools, 
84% of which were public. Under the association's bylaws, 
each member school was represented by its principal 
or a faculty member. These representatives selected 
members of the governing legislative council and board of 
control from eligible principals, assistant principals, and 
superintendents. Moreover, the Court pointed out that 
public school officials not only controlled, but 
overwhelmingly performed, all but the purely ministerial 
acts by which the association existed and functioned in 
practical terms. As such, the entwinement of the public 
schools and the association was pervasive. See id. at 932- 
33. 
 
The Court also discussed and distinguished its earlier 
decision in Tarkanian, where it had held that the NCAA was 
not a state actor. It initially noted that in Tarkanian, 
various factors supported a conclusion that the NCAA was 
a state actor. For example, UNLV had some part in setting 
the NCAA's rules. Additionally, the Supreme Court of 
Nevada had determined that UNLV had delegated its 
traditionally exclusive public authority over personnel to 
the NCAA. See id. at 931. However, Tarkanian ultimately 
held that the NCAA was not a state actor because its 
policies were shaped by several hundred member 
institutions, most of them having no connection with 
Nevada, and exhibiting no color of Nevada law. See id. The 
Court then pointed out that, contrary to the NCAA, the 
state association before it was an organization whose 
member schools are all within a single state. In light of this 
difference, Tarkanian did not apply. See id. (stating that 
"dictum in Tarkanian pointed to a contrary result on facts 
like ours . . . ."). 
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According to Smith, Brentwood implies that Cureton 
incorrectly interpreted Tarkanian to conclude that the 
voluntary nature of the NCAA's relationship with its 
members undermined its "controlling authority." In other 
words, Brentwood holds that the voluntary nature of an 
association, i.e., the fact that members are free to depart, 
is not determinative of whether members are "entwined 
with, or under the control of " the association. Thus, she 
contends that Tarkanian's determination that the NCAA 
was not a state actor turned primarily upon the fact that 
NCAA members were not within a single state (Nevada), 
rather than upon the voluntary nature of their relationship 
with the NCAA. In support of this contention, she relies on 
the following language: 
 
       Since it was difficult to see the NCAA, not as a 
       collective membership, but as a surrogate for the one 
       State, we held the organization's connection with 
       Nevada too insubstantial to ground a state action 
       claim. 
 
       But dictum in Tarkanian pointed to a contrary result 
       on facts like ours, with an organization whose member 
       public schools are all within a single State. 
 
Id. at 932. She also points to the Court's remarks that "it 
avails the Association nothing to stress that the State 
neither coerced nor encouraged the actions complained of " 
and "[n]o school is forced to join." Id. at 928, 934. In light 
of this language, she contends that Cureton's "broader 
reading" of Tarkanian is no longer viable. 
 
We disagree with Smith's contention that, in the wake of 
Brentwood, our interpretation of Tarkanian is flawed. 
Although the NCAA's "collective membership" of varying 
states largely motivated the holding in Tarkanian, the Court 
nonetheless expressly relied upon the NCAA members' 
voluntary relationship with the NCAA. Indeed, after 
explaining that the NCAA cannot be considered a state 
actor because a vast number of states shape its policy, the 
Tarkanian Court stated, "[s]tate action nonetheless might lie 
if UNLV, by embracing the NCAA's rules, transformed them 
into state rules and the NCAA into a state actor." 
Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 194, 109 S.Ct. at 463 (emphasis 
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added). The Tarkanian Court then went on to explain that 
this transformation did not occur because the "UNLV 
retained the authority to withdraw from the NCAA and 
establish its own standards." Thus, it concluded that 
"[n]either UNLV's decision to adopt the NCAA's standards 
nor its minor role in their formulation is a sufficient reason 
for concluding that the NCAA was acting under color of 
Nevada law when it promulgated standards governing 
athlete recruitment, eligibility, and academic performance." 
Id. at 195, 109 S.Ct. at 463-64. 
 
Further, the Court explained that the NCAA's 
investigation, enforcement proceedings, and consequent 
recommendations did not constitute state action. The Court 
noted that although 
 
       it is true that a State may delegate authority to a 
       private party and thereby make the party a state actor, 
       . . . UNLV delegated no power to the NCAA to take 
       specific action against any university employee. The 
       commitment by UNLV to adhere to NCAA enforcement 
       procedures was enforceable only by sanctions that the 
       NCAA might impose on UNLV itself. 
 
Id. at 195-96, 109 S.Ct. at 464. Finally, the Court rejected 
Tarkanian's argument that the NCAA's "power is so great 
that the UNLV had no practical alternative to compliance 
with its demands." It stated: "The university's desire to 
remain a powerhouse among the Nation's college basketball 
teams is understandable, and nonmembership in the NCAA 
obviously would thwart that goal. But that does not mean 
that [alternatives] were nonexistent." Id. at 465 n.19, 109 
S.Ct. at 465 n.19. 
 
As the above language indicates, Tarkanian's discussion 
of UNLV's influence on NCAA rulemaking is distinct from 
its examination of whether UNLV ceded its authority to the 
NCAA. Thus, Brentwood did not abandon Tarkanian's 
discussion and holding regarding the NCAA's alleged 
control over its members; rather, it simply distinguished 
Tarkanian, pointing out that, in contrast to the state 
association before it, the NCAA's policies were not shaped 
by one state alone. Accordingly, Tarkanian is still intact and 
Cureton's interpretation is sound. 
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Smith also contends that Brentwood suggests that a less 
restrictive standard than "controlling authority" governs 
Title IX liability. Specifically, she argues that the NCAA was 
"pervasively entwined" in the operations of its members and 
thus is subject to Title IX. We disagree. The Supreme Court 
in Brentwood stated: "We have treated a nominally private 
entity as a state actor when it is `entwined with 
governmental policies' or when government is `entwined in 
[its] management or control.' " 21 S.Ct. at 930 (citations 
omitted). Similar to "pervasive entwinement,""controlling 
authority" exists when a public entity receiving federal 
dollars has delegated control to a private actor or is 
"entwined in its management or control." Although the 
"public entwinement" theory differs from the"controlling 
authority" theory in that it focuses on whether a public 
entity controls or manages a private entity, its requirement 
of control is no less rigorous. Thus, we do not think the 
standards substantially differ. 
 
In addition, Smith contends that Cureton does not apply 
to the present case because it is procedurally  
distinguishable. Specifically, she argues that Cureton 
examined the NCAA's controlling authority on appeal from 
summary judgment. In contrast, Smith is appealing from 
an order granting a motion to dismiss and denying a 
motion for leave to amend her complaint. Therefore, she 
contends that she should be permitted to conduct discovery 
to determine whether her case is factually distinguishable 
from Cureton. She concedes, however, that member 
institutions currently retain the choice to risk sanctions or 
withdraw from the NCAA if they do not want to abide by its 
rules and regulations. See Appellant's Br. at 19. As we 
explained in Cureton, although this option is unpalatable, it 
is nonetheless an option. Moreover, Smith does not contest 
that member institutions still "decide what applicants to 
admit, what employees to hire, and what facilities to 
acquire." These facts heavily influenced our decision in 
Cureton. Therefore, the differences in procedural posture do 
not require that Smith be allowed to conduct discovery. 
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B. The NCAA's Relationship with the NYSP 
 
Smith also argues that the NCAA is subject to Title IX 
because it receives federal financial assistance through the 
NYSP and the Fund.6 The NCAA does not challenge this 
assertion and instead suggests that we remand to the 
District Court for discovery and resolution of "whether the 
NCAA's relationship with the NYSP is sufficient to subject it 
to Title IX coverage." We agree and hold that Smith's 
allegations regarding the relationship between the NYSP, 
the Fund, and the NCAA, if proven, would establish that 
the NCAA is a recipient of federal funds within the meaning 
of Title IX. 
 
Under federal regulations, a "recipient" of federal 
financial assistance is defined as, 
 
       any public or private agency, institution or 
       organization, or other entity, or any other person, to 
       whom Federal financial assistance is extended directly 
       or through another recipient and which operates an 
       educational program or activity which receives or 
       benefits from such assistance, including any subunit, 
       successor, assignee, or transferee thereof. 
 
34 C.F.R. S 106.2(h). Thus, an entity may receive federal 
financial assistance indirectly and still be considered a 
recipient for purposes of Title IX. See Grove City Coll. v. 
Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 563-70, 104 S.Ct. 1211, 1216-19 
(1984). In Grove City College, the Court held that Grove City 
College was an indirect recipient as a result of the federal 
grant money that students used to pay their tuition bills. 
The Court reasoned that Congress ultimately intended 
colleges and universities to receive the grant money at 
issue, even if it was transferred through students. See id. 
 
Later, in Department of Transportation v. Paralyzed 
Veterans of America, 477 U.S. 597, 106 S.Ct. 2705 (1986), 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. It is important to note that if the NCAA is a federal funding recipient 
based on the NYSP's receipt of federal dollars, then all of the NCAA's 
programs fall under Title IX's proscriptions, including its implementation 
of the Postbaccalaureate Bylaw, which is at issue in this case. See 20 
U.S.C. S 1687 (Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1997) (amending Title IX to 
define "program or activity" to include institution wide coverage). 
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the Court drew the distinction between entities that 
indirectly benefit from federal financial assistance and 
those that indirectly receive assistance. It held that S 504 of 
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 does not apply to commercial 
airlines by virtue of financial assistance the government 
provides to airports.7 The Court concluded that S 504 
covers those who receive the aid, but not those who merely 
have a beneficial relationship with entities receiving such 
assistance. The Court's decision relied upon Congress' 
power to enact the Rehabilitation Act pursuant to the 
Spending Clause of the Constitution. The Court stated that: 
"Congress limited the scope of S 504 coverage as a form of 
contractual cost of the recipient's agreement to accept the 
federal funds." Id. at 605, 106 S.Ct. at 2711. It concluded 
that commercial airlines, although beneficiaries of the 
funding, were not "recipients" of the assistance because 
only the airport operators were "in a position to accept or 
reject their obligations as a part of the decision whether or 
not to `receive' federal funds." Id. at 606, 106 S.Ct. at 2711. 
As such, the intent of the grant-maker is not the only 
relevant consideration regarding whether an entity is an 
indirect recipient of federal financial assistance. Courts 
should also consider the degree to which the entity is able 
to control decisions made with respect to the money, the 
most important decision being whether the grant money 
should be accepted at all. 
 
Here, Smith alleges that the NCAA indirectly received 
federal financial assistance by virtue of its relationship with 
the NYSP and the Fund. According to Smith, the NCAA 
effectively controlled the NYSP and the Fund. Specifically, 
she alleges inter alia, that: 1) the NYSP Committee was an 
NCAA committee responsible for the administration of the 
NYSP; 2) the Council of the NCAA, the entity that directed 
the general policy of the NCAA during certain periods, 
limited the powers of the Fund's Board of Directors; 3) the 
Executive Director of the NCAA and the chairperson of the 
NYSP Committee were ex officio members of the Fund's 
Board of Directors; 4) all of the members of the Fund's 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Section 504 prohibits discrimination based on disability in 
substantially the same terms that Title IX uses to prohibit gender 
discrimination. 
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Board were either employees of the NCAA or members of 
the NCAA's NYSP Committee; 5) the Fund had to report to 
the Council of the NCAA on an annual basis; 6) upon 
dissolution of the Fund, its assets will be distributed 
exclusively to the NCAA; and 7) the NCAA's Executive 
Director remarked that the NYSP is "one of the NCAA's best 
kept secrets." Appellant's Br. at 13-14 (citing Bowers v. 
NCAA, 9 F. Supp. 2d 460, 493-94 (D.N.J. 1998)). 
 
In our view, these allegations, if proven, are sufficient to 
bring the NCAA under the purview of Title IX. Although we 
are hesitant to impose Title IX obligations on an entity that 
is not a direct recipient of federal financial assistance, we 
have nonetheless noted that "those who truly assume 
control of federally-funded programs are in a position to 
accept or reject that control as part of a decision whether 
or not to receive the federal funds indirectly." See Cureton, 
198 F.3d at 118. We believe that Smith's allegations 
establish that the NCAA "truly assum[ed] control" of the 
NYSP and its Fund. Smith's allegations render the NCAA, 
the NYSP, and the Fund virtually indistinct. In light of this 
alleged control, the NCAA did more than "indirectly benefit" 
from federal assistance like the commercial airlines in 
Paralyzed Veterans; rather, through the NYSP and its 
Fund, it was in a "position to decide whether to`receive' 
federal funds and thereby accept the concomitant 
obligations of [Title IX]." Paralyzed Veterans, 477 U.S. at 
606; 106 S.Ct. at 2711. 
 
Several district courts have arrived at this same  
conclusion.8 First, in Cureton v. NCAA, No. Civ. A. 97-131, 
1997 WL 634376 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 9, 1997), the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
examined the NYSP relationship theory in the context of the 
NCAA's motion for summary judgment against student 
athletes who alleged violations under Title VI. The court 
held that "if the National Youth Sports Program Fund is 
nothing more than a sham to disguise the NCAA's use of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Additionally, the Department of Health and Human Services has 
issued two letter determinations that the NCAA is a recipient of federal 
assistance by virtue of the Department's grant to the NYSP Fund. See 
Appellant's Br. at 14 n.2. 
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federal funds for its own benefit, then the NCAA does 
receive federal financial assistance." Id.  at *2. However, 
based on the record before it, the court was unable to make 
a determination. As such, it denied the motion and held 
that, at trial, the plaintiffs had to prove that the NCAA 
received federal financial assistance. 
 
Similarly, in Bowers v. NCAA, 9 F. Supp. 2d 460 (D.N.J. 
1998), the United States District Court for the District of 
New Jersey dismissed the NCAA's motion for summary 
judgment in a suit claiming discrimination underS 504 of 
the Rehabilitation Act. Bowers made extensive findings to 
support its conclusion that there was a genuine issue of 
material fact regarding "whether the NCAA receives federal 
funds through the [Fund] or whether the NCAA is 
intertwined with the [Fund] such that it cannot be 
considered separate." Id. at 494. Smith's allegations mirror 
these findings. 
 
The District Court revisited the issue two years later. See 
Bowers v. NCAA, 118 F. Supp. 2d 494 (D.N.J. 2000). The 
court found that "there is evidence that the NCAA may be 
in control of the NYSP and the federal funds the NYSP 
receives." Id. at 528. In particular, it noted that the NYSP 
was established in 1969 and was run exclusively by the 
NCAA until 1989, when a not-for-profit corporation, the 
Fund, was created to administer the NYSP. According to a 
member of the NYSP's Board of Directors, the Fund was 
established because the NCAA wanted to ensure that it was 
not a recipient of federal grant dollars or a contractor with 
the federal government. The court explained that, despite 
the creation of the Fund, the NCAA's role in relation to the 
NYSP essentially remained the same. For example, it 
administers the Fund for a fee of one dollar per year. The 
Fund has no employees and its business address is the 
same as the NCAA's. Moreover, the court stated that the 
NCAA "seems to have the ability to influence significantly 
how the NYSP's federal funding is spent[ ]" given the 
involvement of the NCAA with the Fund's Board of 
Directors. Id. at 528. In spite of some evidence to the 
contrary, the court held that there was a genuine issue of 
material fact as to whether the NCAA was a recipient of 
federal financial assistance. The court concluded,"[t]o 
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ignore this evidence and hold that the NCAA does not 
exercise control over the [Fund's] federal funding would be 
to elevate form over substance in a way that should not be 
countenanced." Id. at 529. 
 
We agree with the District Courts of Pennsylvania and 
New Jersey. Amending Smth's complaint to include an 
allegation that the NCAA is a federal funding recipient by 
virtue of its relationship with the NYSP and the Fund would 
allow it to survive a motion to dismiss and thus would not 
be futile. See Cureton, 198 F.3d at 190 (citations omitted) 
(explaining that a district court justifiably may deny leave 
to amend on grounds such as undue delay, bad faith, 
dilatory motive, and prejudice, as well as on the ground 
that an amendment would be futile). In other words, 
Smith's complaint, as amended, would survive a motion to 
dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted. See id. at 190 (citations omitted) (explaining that 
an amendment is futile if the complaint, as amended, 
would not survive a motion for failure to state a claim upon 
which relief could be granted). As such, we will remand to 
the District Court to allow Smith to amend her complaint to 
include the NYSP relationship theory. The District Court 
should conduct discovery and make findings with respect to 
this allegation.9 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the District 
Court's denial of Smith's motion to amend her complaint 
with respect to her Title IX claim. In light of this 
conclusion, we will remand to the District Court for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. We emphasize that we make no findings of fact. Rather, we simply 
hold that Smith presents a viable theory for subjecting the NCAA to Title 
IX's requirements and thus her proposed amendment would not be 
futile. We hold no opinion as to whether Smith's allegations are true or 
whether the NCAA ultimately controlled the NYSP and the Fund. These 
are questions for the District Court to determine. 
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McKEE, Circuit Judge, concurring: 
 
I join part II B -- The NCAA's Relationship with the NYSP 
-- fully, and without reservation. However, I concur with 
the discussion in part II A -- Controlling Authority Theory 
only because I agree that we are bound by the panel's 
decision in Cureton v. National Collegiate Athletic 
Association, 198 F.3d 107 (1999, 3rd Cir) (McKee, J. 
dissenting). See I.O.P. 9.1 ("no subsequent panel overrules 
the holding in a published opinion of a previous panel."). 
 
Inasmuch as I have previously noted why I believe that 
the decision in NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179 (1988) 
supports the argument that there are material issues of fact 
as to whether the NCAA can be subject to Title IX under the 
Controlling Authority Theory, I will not reiterate my position 
here in detail. Rather, I rely upon the lengthy discussion of 
Tarkanian that I set forth in my dissenting opinion in 
Cureton. See Cureton, 198 F.3d at 122-126. 
 
There, I noted that the Supreme Court's conclusion that 
the relationship between the NCAA and the University of 
Nevada at Las Vegas ("UNLV") established only that UNLV 
was not a state actor. The Court left open the issue before 
us; whether that relationship is such as to allow the 
plaintiffs to succeed under a "controlling authority" theory 
of recovery. Nothing in my colleagues' discussion of the 
issues sub judice convinces me that my reading of 
Tarkanian is erroneous insofar as it relates to"controlling 
authority" liability under Title IX. In fact, it only reinforces 
my belief that we incorrectly decided Cureton. 
 
The majority relies upon the fact that " `UNLV's options 
[in Tarkanian] were unpalatable does not mean that they 
were nonexistent.' " Maj. op. at 7 (quoting Tarkanian, 488 
U.S. at 198 n. 19). However, the Court's pronouncement 
must be read in context with the state action analysis it 
was undertaking. It does not control our inquiry into 
whether the NCAA is a "controlling authority." I am not 
nearly as impressed as the majority that the Court in 
Tarkanian, held that UNLV was not a state actor because it 
had unpalatable choices. Consider a scenario where A can 
impose such unpalatable consequences upon B that B has 
no choice but to submit to A's will. A is controlling B. That 
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practical reality is not altered by the theoretical possibility 
that B can defy A at A's peril and pay dearly for the act of 
defiance. In fact, this is precisely how power and control 
are exercised and manifested. Other than direct 
administrative or legal control, I can think of no better way 
for one entity to control another than by making the cost of 
defiance so high that the controlled entity's only realistic 
alternative is submission. The NCAA clearly imposed its will 
on UNLV in Tarkanian and forced the university to do 
something that was against the will of the university's top 
administrators, and which they thought was unfair. 
Accordingly, Tarkanian does not support denying the 
plaintiff 's "controlling authority" theory as a matter of law. 
However, our holding in Cureton does. Therefore, I must 
concur in the majority's opinion. 
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